Battlefield despatches from Bangladesh

Battlefield despatches from Bangladesh of Lt.Gen.(retd.) Satish Nambiar, former DGMO, former Commander of UN Forces in Bosnia and a long serving DG of the USI.

AN ACCOUNT OF TWO MAJOR BATTLE ACTIONS DURING THE 1971 

WAR OF LIBERATION IN BANGLA DESH THAT LED TO THE 

AWARD OF THE VIR CHAKRA TO 

MAJOR SATISH NAMBIAR OC ‘Y’ COMPANY 

1ST BATTALION THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY (JANGI PALTAN)

Preamble

In early January 1971 I was posted from the Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters, to the  1st Battalion, The Maratha Light Infantry (Jangi Paltan) then in Nagaland as part of 95 Mountain Brigade under 8 Mountain Division. In early September, my name came up for attending the Senior Command course at the then College of Combat (now Army War College). As war clouds gathered over the sub-continent, the course was terminated prematurely, and we were directed to return to our units post-haste. I rejoined the Battalion on 5th November 1971 at a location South of Tura in Meghalaya on the border with Bangla Desh, to which location it had moved as part of 95 Mountain Brigade operationally under 101 Communication Zone Area. I was asked to assume command of ‘Y’ Company (also referred to in the Battalion as ‘VC’ Company in context of the fact that Sepoy Namdeo Jadhav of the company had been awarded the Victoria Cross at the battle of the Senio River in Italy during World War II).

 

A Copy-Book Ambush

The Battalion was actively engaged in patrolling, raids and ambushes across the Border in preparation for the war that was to inevitably follow. Though the citation for the award of the Vir Chakra is specific to my actions during the intense battle at Jamalpur on 10-11 December 1971, it would be of interest to readers to be made aware of the details of an ambush undertaken by the Battalion on night 13/14 November 1971. Consequent to a pattern followed by the Pakistani forces in the area in moving up a battery of heavy mortars to deal with the Brigade’s futile efforts to subdue an outpost on the border, the Brigade Commander, Brigadier H S Kler (who was to be later awarded the Mahavir Chakra) asked our Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel K S Brar (who was also awarded the Vir Chakra and later commanded the Division that undertook Operation Blue Star, and went on to become Eastern Army Commander), to execute an ambush of the Heavy Mortar Battery. It was decided that to enable the ambush, the Brigade Commander would ask one of the other units (13 GUARDS) to simulate another attack on the Kamalpur border post. “Bulbul” Brar decided on two company ambush on the road leading from the Pakistani position at Bakshiganj to the Kamalpur border post, with another company to be deployed on the Jamalpur-Bakshiganj road to deal with or delay reinforcements, and the fourth company in reserve with the battalion headquarters about a kilometre and a half from the ambush site. 

As the senior company commander, I was asked by “Bulbul” to co-ordinate and oversee the ambush that was to be executed by ‘Y’ and ‘C’ companies (the latter commanded by Keshav Puntambekar (who was to become my second-in-command when I assumed command of the Battalion from “Bulbul” in mid-April 1972 after the War). The two of us and our platoon commanders, carried out a detailed reconnaissance of the ambush site on night 8th - 9th November 1971, being guided to the area by a few of our local Mukti Bahini colleagues; through hip-deep marsh and paddy fields to avoid villages that were frequented by armed Razakars loyal to the Pakistani regime. An appropriate site was selected with sugar cane fields that permitted some concealment from the road. Detailed locations of each platoon were decided and a proposed plan of action in regard to the signal for opening fire was agreed upon. The reconnaissance party returned to the battalion location before dawn on 9th November. The next four days were spent in briefings, rehearsals and fine-tuning the details of the operation.

The Battalion set out immediately after dusk on 13 November 1971 with ‘Y’ Company in the lead with myself right up in front, followed by ‘C’ Company, then ‘D’ Company that was to take up position on the Bakshiganj-Jamalpur road, and finally the battalion headquarters and ‘A’ Company (reserve). The route followed was the same taken by the reconnaissance party through marsh and paddy fields to avoid villages and civil population. We reached the ambush site at about midnight and set about taking up positions within the sugar cane fields approximately 75 metres from the road, by digging slit trenches at about the third row of cane. I had positioned myself with the platoon nearest to the Bakshiganj position with a Medium Machine Gun detachment and a 57 mm recoilless gun detachment next to me, whose crew had strict instructions that they would only open fire on my specific orders. The plan agreed upon was that the platoon of ‘C’ Company deployed towards the Kamalpur post direction on the far side (West) of the road would open fire when the leading vehicle of the Pakistani heavy mortar column came within a range of about 50 metres. The idea being that this would cause the Pakistani personnel to dismount and take up positions on the East side of the road where the main ambush force was deployed, thus making them totally vulnerable targets. 

At about 0400 hours 14 November 1971, 13 GUARDS launched a simulated assault against the Kamalpur border post and shortly before dawn we received a radio message from the Brigade Commander that the Heavy Mortar Battery had commenced its move forward from Bhakshiganj to deploy in support of the post. As it happened, the complete area was enveloped by intense fog that had reduced visibility to barely 30 to 40 metres. Being located closest to Bakshiganj, I heard the sound of vehicles approaching and alerted my own company as also ‘C’ company, all of us being on a common radio net. I was soon able to see the hazy outline of the first vehicle and noticed that it was led by a few Pakistani soldiers on foot, apparently looking for possible land mines or improvised explosives on the road. Indicating to my men to hold fire, I whispered on the radio to alert my colleague Keshav Puntambekar, and more importantly his platoon commander, Captain Suresh Patil, who was the one designated to open fire first on seeing the leading vehicle within range. The first vehicle went by; the second, third, fourth, and fifth all towing the mortars. But there was no action by Suresh Patil, who on being queried by me on the radio, responded to say that no vehicle had come within sight. In the meanwhile, we could hear a lot of clanging noises the cause for which did not then register. By then, the sixth vehicle was going past my position and the seventh one approaching. I whispered on the radio for all to remain alert, and as the seventh vehicle arrived in sight, I ordered the ‘Ganpat’ manning the 57 mm recoilless gun in the trench adjacent to me to open fire on that vehicle. He did so with great accuracy, and as it happened to be the vehicle carrying ammunition, it went up in flames with a loud explosion. All hell then broke loose with our weapons opening up to the shouts of “Bol Shri Chhattrapati Shivaji Maharaj Ki Jai”, and the Pakistanis not knowing what had hit them. By strange coincidence and stroke of good fortune, at that very time the fog lifted, and we were able to determine that the Pakistanis had actually begun to deploy their mortars at the very site of the ambush. They had no chance. The choice of ambush site could not have been better. The Pakistani Battery was decimated though some of the personnel probably managed to get away. 

As the senior person at the site, in order to assess the situation, and coordinate further actions, I moved from my Company position (accompanied by Sopan my ‘bodyguard’, as our orderlies were called in the Paltan, carrying my radio set), to the gap between my Company’s position and that of ‘C’ Company. While doing so, I was frantically cautioned by my second-in-command Captain Rajendra Dafle (who was also later awarded the Vir Chakra), as also by ‘A’ Company Commander, Major Shashi Pawar, of the presence of a Pakistani medium machine gun team within the gap firing at our troops. I located their presence about 75 yards from where I was, and in an almost reflex action, threw a 36 hand grenade at them, and as it exploded, jumped towards them firing my sten gun, and killing them in the process. I got to know later as we were on our way back to base, that my “bodyguard” had retrieved the .50 inch calibre machine gun from the site as a war trophy. 

I then turned my attention towards disengagement and extrication before we could become targets of an air attack, as it was broad daylight by then. At about that time, I overheard a radio communication from the Brigade Commander to my colleague, ‘C’ Company Commander, asking him to get hold of a mortar barrel so that “we could drink beer from it” on our return to base. I immediately interjected, in the full knowledge that what I was saying would be heard by the Brigade Commander and my Commanding Officer, to instruct Keshav Puntambekar, “not to push our luck”, and that he should immediately disengage and commence return to base. Which we did in an orderly fashion, much to the delight of our “Mukti” colleagues who were over-awed by what we had done to the Pakistanis. We returned to our base at the border, a tired and dishevelled bunch, but in great spirits. It is a measure of our achievement that the Brigade Commander found it appropriate to commend my decision to exercise discretion rather than bravado in so far as “getting a mortar barrel for drinking beer” was concerned. Made somewhat poignant by the fact that the Engineer Company Commander accompanying ’C’ Company with a section, was shot dead by a Pakistani soldier while needlessly trying to insert an explosive charge into a mortar barrel to make it unusable (The only casualty we suffered in an otherwise ‘copy-book’ operation).

The Jamalpur Battle

With the declaration of War on the night of 3rd December 1971, the Battalion moved out on foot from its base on the Border with their big packs on for a long move across country. First to the Pakistani position at Bakshiganj, which the Pakistanis abandoned on the night of 5th December on being engaged by the sub-units of the Jangi Paltan. After a brief halt, the Battalion resumed advance on 6th December, in a wide flanking move on foot, with mortar and machine gun ammunition carried on bullock carts, crossing the Brahmaputra in locally commandeered country boats, to establish, on night 8th – 9th December, a road block approximately 10 kilometres South of Jamalpur on the road leading to Tangail. The Brigade Commander flew in by helicopter to join the Battalion. After a brief discussion with the Commanding Officer, “Bulbul” Brar, they sent one of our local Mukti Bahini colleagues, Zohal Haq Munshi (who was conferred  the ‘Bir Purush’ award by the Government of Bangla Desh after the War), on  a bicycle to Jamalpur with a note to the garrison commander exhorting him to surrender, as the garrison had been surrounded and would otherwise be subjected to air strikes, artillery shelling and ground attack. 

Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmed, the Commanding Officer 31 Baluch and in charge of the Jamalpur garrison, (who we were to catch up with in Dacca later), sent back an audacious note with a bullet enclosed, suggesting that “we get on with the battle, and that he looked forward to next seeing the Commander with a weapon in his hand rather than the pen which he seemed to have such mastery over”. With that the die was cast for the battle of Jamalpur.

Immediately after last light 9th December, the Battalion commenced moving up astride the road to close in on Jamalpur. A couple of hours after midnight, we had moved to within approximately 1000 metres of the Pakistani defences at Jamalpur. Before taking up tactical positions in preparation for the assault on Jamalpur, I had tasked my company second-in-command, Captain Rajendra Dafle, to probe further forward with one of the platoons; in the event, he was able to position himself with the platoon on a raised piece of ground about 300 metres from where the rest of ‘Y’ Company was located, and approximately 700 metres from the Southern edge of the Jamalpur defences. By first light 10th December 1971, the Battalion had taken up reasonably well dug-in tactical positions with my rifle company (Y) on the West of the road, (with one platoon ahead), and ‘C’ Company (under Keshav Puntambekar) on the East; the Battalion Headquarters was positioned behind ‘C’ Company, and co-located with ‘D’ company in depth East of the road, and ‘A’ Company was behind and in depth to my Company positions on the West of the road. In the meanwhile, with 13 Raj Rif closing in on the North bank of the River opposite the Jamalpur garrison on the main axis coming down from the Border, the Brigade Commander had ordered the third battalion, 13 GUARDS to also cross the Brahmaputra on foot and take up positions to the East of the Jangi Paltan road block positions in preparation for a two-battalion assault on Jamalpur. 

As we found out in conversations with the prisoners-of-war later, the Pakistanis were not aware that we had gathered in such strength behind them at Jamalpur. During the daylight hours of 10th December there was some sporadic exchange of fire, including artillery shelling on our positions; fortunately without any casualties on our side, other than a bit of a shell shock suffered by one of the “Ganpats” in my company headquarters in the late evening, when he was thrown up a few feet in the air to hang by his web equipment on a low hanging branch of a tree, due to the blast effect of a heavy mortar shell that landed in our location. Late afternoon 10th December, the Battalion Commander gathered his “Orders” Group at the Battalion Headquarters to apprise us of his plans for the attack and issued his orders to that effect. As the senior company commander, I took it upon myself to ask “Bulbul” to allow us to carry out a detailed reconnaissance of the Pakistani defences that night, so vital for undertaking an assault of a well-prepared and co-ordinated defensive position, and postpone the attack to the following night. While recognising merit in the point I was making, “Bulbul” expressed his inability to postpone the attack, because of the insistence from higher headquarters for political and diplomatic reasons, as also the fact that capturing Jamalpur was vital in order to ensure link-up with the parachute drop at Tangail that was to be undertaken the following night.

We therefore returned to our respective sub-units and commenced preparations for the proposed assault that night. While these preparations were in full swing, we were informed that the attack had been put off to the following night and that we were to carry out reconnaissance and further detailed preparations. In consultation with the Battalion Headquarters and my sub-unit commanders, I planned the patrols for the night, intending to lead one of them myself in the latter portion of the night. Having done so, I thought of giving myself a break from the tensions and pressures that one had been subjected to and eased myself into a crater that had been created by a Pakistani heavy mortar round in my company headquarters location. I had barely closed my eyes for what I thought was some well-deserved rest when, just before midnight, I got a call on the radio set from Rajendra Dafle that some Pakistani vehicles were moving out on the road from Jamalpur, and sought my directions on what he should do. I told him to open fire when they were in range and alerted my own company as also the rest of the Battalion. Within seconds, Rajendra had opened up with his 57 mm recoilless guns, medium machine guns and small arms to set on fire the leading vehicles the Pakistani had ventured out with. All hell immediately broke loose with the fire of rifles and machine guns and cries of “Allah-O-Akbar” as the Pakistanis tried to break out of the road-block we had set up. 

I reached out for my ‘jungle boots’ that I had taken off to relieve the pressure on my aching and somewhat blistered feet, only to find that they had been ripped apart by bullets that were being sprayed all around. I jumped out of the crater and moved up to the forward sections on my bare feet to exhort the “Ganpats” to ensure that they fire for effect on the Pakistanis who were trying to assault our positions and not at random; to their eternal credit, they did so with tremendous calm. In the meanwhile on checking with Rajendra Dafle, I was assured that he and the “Ganpats” in the protective platoon patrol in front were also effectively engaging the Pakistani forces that were trying to dislodge them. While all this was going on, my trusted ‘bodyguard’ presented me with a pair of ‘Hawaii’ chappals that he happened to be carrying in his big pack; why he was carrying this, I never bothered to enquire, because it was a life-saver, or rather, a foot-saver. I continued moving around over next four hours (and also much later), in those chappals to the various positions including the medium machine gun position that did a super job. 

In response to queries on the radio from “Bulbul”, the Commanding Officer, as to what was going on, I was not able to explain what had prompted the Pakistanis to try and break out through the road block we had established, except to assure him that we were fully in control of the situation.  Darkness did not permit a clear analysis, but given the moans of “Paani, Paani” and “Bachao, Bachao”, from many of the seriously wounded Pakistani soldiers lying  in front of our positions, I had little doubt that the Pakistanis had no chance of breaking through our positions. (We were later able to establish that because the Pakistani authorities in Dhaka had become aware of the proposed para-drop and the threat to Dhaka, they had ordered the outposts like Jamalpur to fall back on Dhaka for its defence).

By about 0430 hours 11th December 1971, Pakistani firing and activity had ceased, and we began to hear pleas from the Pakistani soldiers to accept surrender. 61 such surrenders were accepted in the forward company positions (Y and C). As dawn broke, the scale of effectiveness of the Jangi Paltan’s poise and controlled fire became evident; 234 Pakistani troops killed and 23 wounded, in front of the positions of ‘Y’ and ‘C’ companies. The casualties suffered by the Jangi Paltan in the battle were 10 killed (including one from my Company), and eight wounded. On assessing the situation at first light, “Bulbul” ordered me to move forward into Jamalpur with my Company to secure the garrison. As we moved up towards the garrison defences cautiously, and by bounds, a Pakistani soldier, bleeding from his mouth, came out holding a white flag indicating surrender of the garrison. With the Pakistani soldier guiding us, I moved forward quickly with my Company to the compound of the Guest House in Jamalpur where approximately 350 Pakistani troops, including three officers, were marshalled for surrender. 

To the astonishment of the Pakistanis, I took the surrender with a ‘Cap Comforter’ on my head, and ‘Hawaii’ slippers on my feet. Shortly thereafter, I handed over the prisoners to the Commanding Officer, “Bulbul” Brar, who in turn handed over to the Brigade Commander. By then Major General R S Nagra the General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area had landed by helicopter, with Shurajit Sen of All India Radio and Bharti of ‘Dharmayug’ a Mumbai based Hindi weekly, among others. 

I found it appropriate at that stage, to disengage from the proceedings, and returned to the road block position to freshen myself with a wash and a shave. And to write a quick note to my wife (on the ubiquitous ‘forces inland letter’), assuring her that all was well, and asked Mr Bharti to post it on his return to Mumbai.

Sign Off

The next morning, 12th December 1971, the Battalion resumed advance in various forms of transport, including a couple of buses and a ‘fire engine’ to catch up with “Tiger” Siddiqui of the Mukti Bahini, and a historic regimental link up with 2 Para (Maratha) North of Tangail. We then went on to enter Dhaka on the afternoon of 16th December 1971. But those are stories for another occasion.